Publications

“A Defense of the Conceptual Approach to Transcendental Idealism Against Paul Guyer,” Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress: The Court of Reason (2021)

Under Review (Titles have not been provided in order to maintain anonymity)

A paper on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. Draft available.

A paper on Kant’s Indirect Proof of Transcendental Idealism. Draft available.

Dissertation

Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism

In my dissertation I argue for an interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. According to my interpretation, transcendental idealism is the doctrine that space, time, and objects of our experience when taken transcendentally (as they would be outside of the field of our possible experience) do not exist apart from the transcendental subject and are mere representations (are ideal). To avoid a phenomenalist interpretation I emphasize Kant’s empirical realism. I take Kant’s empirical realism to claim that space, time, and objects of our experience when taken empirically (as they would be within the field of our possible experience) exist apart from the empirical subject as empirical things in themselves (are real). I argue for this interpretation by considering arguments in the Critique that argue directly for or are significantly related to Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism.